This paper computes welfare maximizing monetary and tax policy feedback rules, in a calibrated dynamic general equilibrium model with sticky prices. The government makes exogenous final good purchases, levies a proportional income tax, and issues nominal oneperiod bonds. A quadratic approximation method is used to solve the model, and to compute household welfare. Optimized policy has a strong anti-inflation stance and implies persistent fluctuations of the tax rate and of public debt. Very simple optimized policy rules, under which the interest rate just responds to inflation and the tax rate just responds to public debt, yield a welfare level very close to that generated by richer rules.
Introduction
There has been much recent work on the effect of monetary policy rules on welfare and business cycles (see survey by McCallum (1999) ). Fiscal policy rules have received less attention; existing studies follow two approaches: (i) dynamic extensions of Ramsey (1927) that determine welfare maximizing time paths of fiscal instruments; 1 (ii) analyses of the macroeconomic effects of simple fiscal feedback rules (e.g., Taylor (2000)).
The Ramsey approach is appealing as it uses micro-based models and focuses on household welfare as the criterion for evaluating policy. However, that approach faces technical difficulties, as Ramsey problems are generally not concave. 2 Furthermore, Ramseytype studies typically use highly stylized models; also, Ramsey policy rules are often complicated-which may make it difficult to apply them in practice.
By contrast, most studies on simple feedback policy rules use models that are more realistic, but that are not fully micro-based; ad hoc criteria (such as the implied volatilities of output and inflation) are employed to evaluate policy.
This paper numerically computes welfare maximizing operational feedback rules that link monetary and fiscal policy to small sets of easily observable macro variables, for a calibrated business cycle model with staggered price setting à la Calvo (1983) . The (potential) non concavity of the Ramsey problem is inconsequential for the approach here. The model has rigorous micro-foundations, but is richer than those used in most applications of the Ramsey approach. The economy features capital, variable labor supply, monopolistic competition in goods markets, and exogenous shocks to productivity and to government purchases. The government levies a proportional income tax, and issues nominal unconditional one-period bonds. Monetary policy follows a Taylor-style interest rate rule; the tax rate is set as a function of real public debt, productivity and government purchases. The steady state tax rate and the ratios of debt and of government purchases to GDP are calibrated to OECD data. I focus on policies characterized by stationary fluctuations of real public debt around its steady state value.
Under staggered price setting (as assumed here), inflation induces inefficient dispersion of prices across firms (e.g., Erceg et al., 2000) ; in an economy in which price stickiness is the only distortion, optimal monetary policy entails full inflation stabilization, as that policy eliminates inefficient cross-firm price dispersion (e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford (1997) ). The economy here has monopolistic competition and tax distortions-it is shown that, nevertheless, optimized policy under sticky prices implies (almost) full inflation stabilization. In all model variants considered here, optimized policy implies persistent fluctuations of the tax rate, and sizable and persistent fluctuations of real public debt; productivity shocks are much more important as a source of macroeconomic fluctuations than government purchases shocks. Very simple optimized policy rules--under which the interest rate just responds to inflation, and the tax rate just responds to public debt--yield a welfare level very close to that generated by rules that stipulate a response to additional variables.
As optimized policy in the baseline sticky-prices model (with nominal public debt) entails strict inflation stabilization, real debt returns are riskless, in that setting; the behavior of the tax rate and of real activity closely resembles that generated by a flexible-prices model with indexed (real) non-state contingent debt.
By contrast, a flex-prices structure with nominal debt implies a very different optimized tax behavior than the baseline sticky-prices model. In such a structure, inflation does not cause inefficient price dispersion across firms; when exogenous shocks occur, the government can meet its intertemporal budget constraint by altering the real value of the inherited stock of (nominal) public debt via unanticipated inflation changes. As a result, optimized policy in a flex-prices-nominal-debt structure entails sizable inflation volatility, but only small movements of the tax rate. Chari et al. (1991) showed that (optimal) monetaryfiscal Ramsey policy implies high inflation volatility in a flex-prices economy with nominal debt; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004c) and Siu (2004) demonstrated that Ramsey policy entails much lower inflation volatility when prices are sticky. The paper here shows that similar predictions (effect of flex-vs. sticky prices) hold when policy is described by simple optimized rules.
The model is solved using Sims ' (2000) method that is based on a second-order expansion of the equilibrium conditions. In contrast to the linear, certainty-equivalent approximations that are widely used in macroeconomics, this method allows to capture the effect of risk on agents' decision rules and is thus better suited for welfare analysis. Compared to other non-linear methods (see Judd (1998) ), this technique allows to easily solve models with a rich structure. The approach presented in this paper might thus provide a tractable way of computing optimized policy rules using larger micro-based simulation models (such as those currently developed by, i.a., the Fed and IMF). 
Final good production
The final good is produced using the aggregate technology The price of the final good is t P (its marginal cost).
Intermediate goods firms
The technology of the firm that produces intermediate good s is:
3 Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004a) too use a second-order approximation to compute optimized simple monetary/fiscal rules for a New Keynesian model, but that paper focuses on a setting with lump sum taxes. Second order approximations are also used by Benigno and Woodford (2003) who analytically derive optimal monetary-fiscal policy, for a more stylized economy (without capital and with a more restrictive structure of shocks) and by Kim and Kim (2001) who numerically compute optimized tax policy rules, for a two-country RBC model. 4 The structure of preferences, technologies and markets resembles that in Kollmann (2001 Kollmann ( , 2002 Kollmann ( , 2004 
The final good price t P evolves according to
The representative household
Household preferences are described by:
U C L C L . The household accumulates physical capital, subject to the law of motion 1 (1 ) The household chooses a strategy
(2),(3). The following equations are first-order conditions of this problem:
(
The government budget constraint
The government budget constraint is 1 1
(1 )
government final good purchases; t D is the stock of nominal one-period public debt that matures in t.
Market clearing conditions

Markets for intermediates clear as intermediate goods firms meet all demand at posted prices.
Market clearing in final good, labor, and rental capital markets requires:
. Bond market clearing requires: t t A D = .
Policy rules
Much recent research has focused on monetary policy rules that stipulate a response of the interest rate to inflation (e.g., Taylor (1999a)). The baseline interest rate rule considered here is: The tax rate is set as a function of real public debt, and of the exogenous variables:
where /( ) assumptions, a government that initially has positive debt runs fiscal surpluses, until it owns a stock of assets whose interest income covers all subsequent government purchases (at that point, the tax rate is set to zero). This prediction is at odds with the data: throughout modern history governments have been net debtors.
To rule out unrealistic long run behavior of public debt, I impose the restriction that the unconditional mean value of real debt has to be close to its steady state value B: (1), subject to the laws of motion of the endogenous variables implied by household decisions, and subject to (8). I assume that at 0 t= the predetermined 5 The Aiyagari et al. model is more stylized than the structure considered here (it assumes a perfectly competitive, real economy, without capital accumulation or productivity shocks 
Parameters and solution method
The model is calibrated to quarterly data. The steady state real interest rate r is set at 0.01 = r , a value that corresponds roughly to the long-run average ( Empirically, the mean price-change interval is about 4 quarters (Taylor (1999b)).
Hence, I set d=0.75. The steady state growth factor of prices is set at 1 Π= ( Π has no real effects, because of indexing); thus the steady state nominal interest rate is 0.01. 
The model is solved using Sims' (2000) algorithm/computer code that is based on second-order Taylor expansions of the equilibrium conditions, around a (deterministic) steady state. 9 I numerically solve the government's optimization problem; attention is restricted to values of the policy parameters (see (6), (7)) for which a unique stationary equilibrium exists. 
Results
Simulation results are reported in Tables 1-2 (1 ) ((1 ) , ) ( , ). Table 1 show results under sticky prices; Cols. 1-2 pertain to the baseline model (with policy rules (6)- (7)); Cols. 3-4 assume alternative policy rules. Cols. 5-6 assume flexible prices. Cols. 7-8 pertain to the first-best allocation, i.e. to the solution of a social planning problem in which household welfare is maximized subject to the economy's resource constraints (taking { } t G as exogenously given). Table 2 shows dynamic responses to shocks.
Sticky prices
In the baseline model (sticky prices, nominal debt), the optimized policy parameters are . In an economy in which price stickiness is the only distortion (so that the flex-prices equilibrium would be efficient), 10 Up to a 2nd-order approx.: These predictions are based on the assumption that the economy is simultaneously subjected to shocks to productivity and to government purchases; see Col. 1 in Table 1 .
Col. 2 shows predictions for the case where there are just government purchases shocks.
These shocks explain only 16% of the variances of the tax rate, and less than 3% of the variances of consumption and output (that are generated when there are simultaneous productivity and government purchases shocks). t G shocks also have a markedly smaller effect on welfare than productivity shocks ( 0.004% ζ =− when there are just t G shocks).
Dynamic responses
Under optimized policy, a positive productivity shock triggers a rise in output, consumption, investment and hours worked; the price level remains (essentially) constant, and the tax rate falls. Initially, tax revenues rise; real debt falls, with a one-period delay (in the long run, real debt reverts to its pre-shock level). On impact, a positive shock to government purchases raises output, investment and hours worked, and it lowers consumption; tax revenues rise, and real debt increases. (See Panels (a.1), (b.1) in Table 2 .)
Richer/simpler policy rules
Experiments with richer policy rules (that permit a direct response of the policy instruments to selected additional variables) only yield very small welfare gains, compared to the baseline rules (6),(7).
For example, Col. 3 (Table 1) assumes that t i is set as a function of inflation, GDP and the real deficit, while t τ is a function of real debt, productivity, government purchases and inflation: (6), (7)) corresponds to a (permanent) consumption increase of merely 0.00001%.
Col. 4 assumes that the tax rate just responds to real debt (while the interest rate just responds to inflation, as under (6)); there, the optimized policy parameters are: 9.53
8.56
B τ Γ = ; again, predicted statistics are close to those under the baseline specification (e.g., standard deviations of GDP, tax rate and inflation: 6.23%, 1.69% and 0.01%, respectively); the welfare loss from using the simpler tax rate rule (instead of (7)) is 0.00076%.
Comparison with first-best economy
A comparison between the distorted sticky-prices economy and the first-best (undistorted) economy (Cols. 7-8) shows: (i) The levels of economic activity and welfare are noticeably lower in the distorted equilibrium--for example, steady state consumption and hours worked are 43% and 34% lower, respectively (than in the first-best economy); the welfare difference is equivalent to a permanent 21.46% consumption loss (not reported in Table 1 ).
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(ii) Responses to shocks are qualitatively similar, across the two structures. In the stickyprices economy, economy, output, hours worked and investment respond less strongly--on impact--to productivity shocks, and more strongly to government purchases shocks, than in the first-best economy. (See Panels (a.3), (b.3) in Table 2 .)
Flexible prices Nominal debt
Optimized policy under flexible prices (and nominal debt) differs markedly from optimized policy under sticky prices: with flex prices, the optimized inflation and debt coefficients are 0.97
In a flex-prices-nominal-debt structure, inflation does not cause inefficient price dispersion across firms; when exogenous shocks occur, the government can meet its intertemporal budget constraint by altering the real value of the inherited stock of (nominal) public debt via unanticipated inflation changes. As a result, optimized policy entails sizable inflation volatility, and much smaller movements of the tax rate than under sticky prices (standard deviations of t Π and t τ under flexible prices: 13.2% and 0.1%, respectively).
As in the baseline sticky-prices structure, the real value of the stock of debt is highly volatile, and debt and the tax rate are highly serially correlated. Table 2 (Panels (a.2), (b.2)) shows that, in the flex-prices-nominal-debt model variant, the government responds to a positive productivity innovation and the ensuing rise in tax revenues by inducing an unanticipated fall in the price level, and thus a rise in real public debt (thereafter, real debt reverts to its steady state value); a positive shock to government purchases triggers an unanticipated rise in the price level, and thus a fall in real debt. Chari et al. (1991) showed that (optimal) monetary/fiscal Ramsey policy implies high inflation volatility in a flex-prices economy with nominal debt; Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe 
Indexed debt
Col. 6 considers a flex-prices economy with indexed debt. The government cannot use unanticipated inflation changes to meet its solvency condition, in that setting (as there monetary policy has no real effects). Welfare ( 0.072%) ζ =− is lower than in the flex-prices structure with nominal debt. The optimized fiscal policy rule, and the implied behavior of real variables are very similar to those generated in the sticky-prices economy with nominal debt.
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the strict inflation stabilization entailed by optimized policy in the sticky-prices structure implies: (i) all firms set identical prices (as is the case under flexible prices); (ii) nominal bonds are riskless, in real terms (as under indexed debt). 
9.09 9.09 8.56 -0.57 Table 1 for definitions of other variables.) Responses of capital pertain to end-of-period stocks
Responses are generated as follows. At some date T all state variables are set at steady state values. A "baseline" paths for endogenous variables is computed by setting all exogenous innovations to zero at t T ≥ . Then responses to one-time 1% innovations at T are computed; the 
